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LOSS OF PARENTAL SOCIETY AND COMPANIONSHIP: INFANT'S ACTION AGAINST PERSON WHO NEGLIGENTLY INJURED FA-

THER-Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690
(Mass. 1980)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The rights of individuals to recover for nonpecuniary losses have
evolved steadily since the inception of tort law. One of the first steps in
this evolution was allowing recovery for loss of services under the
master/servant relationship.' Under this doctrine, an employer or
master could recover the value of his employee's services, if lost
through a defendant's tortious conduct.' In order to recover, the plaintiff was required to show actual, measurable monetary loss, such as the
replacement costs for his lost servant.'
The master/servant analogy was later transposed upon the familial
relationship, with the husband in the role of master and the wife and
children as servants.' If his spouse or child fell victim to a tortfeasor,
the "man of the house" could recover the value of his loss from the
tortfeasor. Recoverable losses included such damages as the costs of
1. Ames v. Union Ry. Co., 117 Mass. 541, 19 Am. Rep. 426 (1875). Ames involved a
master attempting to sue for lost services of his apprentice who was negligently injured by a
common carrier. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held, "[t]he relation of master and apprentice . . . is such as will sustain an action in the name of the master for an injury to the apprentice
causing disability, per quod servituim amisit." Id. at 543.
2. 117 Mass. 541, 19 Am. Rep. 426 (1875); Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 155 F.2d 992,
1000 (3d Cir. 1946). The Jones case involved an employer seeking indemnity from a third party
defendant for maintenance and cure, and wage payments it had to make to its injured employee.
The employee stumbled on the employer's dock because of inadequate lighting, falling into the
third party defendant's open ditch. Deciding to allow the employer to recover damages for loss of
the employee's services as well as for money paid for maintenance and cure, the court stated: "We
believe that the law of Pennsylvania follows the general law and will permit the employee to
recover from a negligent tortfeasor for the value of the services of his injured employee." Id. at
1000.
3. Fluker v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 81 Ga. 461, 8 S.E. 529 (1888). In Fluker an
employee of a catering business was assaulted and physically ousted from a railroad's property,
across a public street. Although the employee suffered no debilitating physical injuries, his employer nevertheless attempted to bring suit for assault under the Master/Servant Doctrine. Deny-.
ing the employer's cause of action, the Georgia Supreme Court stated that although the employee
would have a valid cause of action for assault, before the employer can maintain an action, he
must show some loss of service or some impairment of the servant's capacity to render service. Id.
at 465, 466, 8 S.E. at 531.
4. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 124 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser states, "the husband's interest
in his relation with his wife first received recognition as a matter of her services to him as a
servant." Id. at 874. Over hundreds of years, however, the requirement of actual services was
dropped. Currently the law recognizes the husband's interest in the society, sexual intercourse,
and conjugal affection as well as the services of his wife. Recovery can be had for interference
with any one of these four protected interests. Id. at 873-81.
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replacing the son with a fieldhand or the wife with a maid.
Slowly, and coincidentally with the transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society, the requirement of showing actual lost
services was eroded.' The husband became entitled to recover for such
nonpecuniary losses as society, companionship, and consortium. 6 Although for an extended time these recoveries were only available to
men, some jurisdictions eventually concluded there was no good reason
to deny wives and children the opportunity to recover in limited, quasi
punitive actions such as under Wrongful Death and Dramshop Acts.7
Recovery for loss of spousal consortium and loss of a child's society remained exclusively a male right for years after women and children gained the right to recover nonpecuniary damages under Wrongful Death and Dramshop Acts.8 To justify this rule, courts continued to
cite the archaic master/servant analogy or the equally antiquated theory that all familial actions and recoveries belonged to the husband. 9
Eventually, however, as the equality of women was recognized and
the master/servant analogy was dropped, courts began to allow women
to maintain actions for loss of the husband's consortium in negligent
injury actions. 10 During this liberalization of nonpecuniary loss rules

5. See note 4 supra; see also, Kelley v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 168 Mass. 308, 46
N.E. 1063 (1897), in which a husband was allowed to bring suit for loss of his negligently injured
wife's consortium even though she had already been fully compensated for her injuries through an
action of her own. See also Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123, 45 Am. Rep. 307 (1883), holding that a husband's action for loss of his spouse's consortium was maintainable even if he could
not show loss of services or that he incurred expenses as a consequence of her injuries.
6. See note 5 supra.
7. For actions allowing a wife's recovery under Dramshop Acts see Benes v. Campion, 186
Minn. 578, 244 N.W. 72 (1932); Whipple v. Rosenstock, 99 Neb. 153, 155 N.W. 898 (1915);
Wood v. Lentz, 116 Mich. 275, 74 N.W. 462 (1898). For cases involving actions brought under
Wrongful Death Acts see notes 57 and 58 infra.
8. Pyle v. Waechter, 202 Iowa 695, 210 N.W. 926 (1926). In a mother's suit for alienation
of her son's affections, the Pyle court concluded that although the father had a right to the child's
society and affection the mother did not. See also Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503, 20 A. 83 (1890). The
Maine Supreme Court in Doe did not allow a wife's cause of action for seduction of her husband
although it acknowledged that husbands' actions for the seduction of their wives were commonly
allowed. To justify continuing this seemingly inequitable rule, the court reasoned that "a wife's
infidelity may impose upon her husband the support of another man's child, and, what is still
worse, it. may throw suspicion upon the legitimacy of his own children." Id. at -_, 20 A. at 84.
For an excellent overview of the history of the common law refusal to allow a wife to sue for loss
of consortium, see Sims v. Sims, 79 N.J.L. 577, 76 A. 1063 (1910).
9. See note 8 supra.
10. Hitaffer v. Arzonne Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
852 (1950). Plaintiff's husband was seriously injured while employed by defendant. The wife's
claim for loss of consortium was not allowed by the district court. On appeal, the court of appeals
reversed, holding that a husband and wife have equal rights which will receive equal protection
under the law; see also Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969).
Mr. Thill was permanently paralyzed as a result of a work-related accident. His wife brought an
action for loss of consortium. The Minnesota Supreme Court, recognizing that many other jurishttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/10
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for women, children were left in the background. 1 Although some
courts allowed recovery for loss of parental society in enticement ac-

tions,1 2 until the case of Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.,"s

only one jurisdiction had allowed an action for this loss in a negligent
4
injury case.1
dictions now grant a wife's loss of consortium claim, overruled its previous decision refusing the
cause; see also Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935). The .Eschenbach
court held that a wife has a right of action for loss of consortium against one who negligently
injured her husband. The court further held that because the wife's action is a derivative right she
may only recover if her husband recovers from the same defendant. To surmount the multiple
litigation threat, the court ruled that it will only allow the wife's claim if it is joined with the
husband's; contra Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952). The plaintiff claimed loss of her
husband's consortium due to injuries he suffered through defendant's negligence. The court traced
the history of consortium claims noting that women have never had a common law right to a
husband's consortium. The court, when refusing to recognize the cause of action, pointed to a
Florida statute adopting English common law as the law of the state. The court determined that if
change were to come it would have to come from the legislature.
11. Pound, Individual Interests in Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1916). Dean
Pound noted that a child does have an interest in the family relationship that is valid and vital,
"[b]ut the law has done little to secure these interests." Id. at 185.
12. The first case allowing a child recovery for loss of parental society in an enticement
action was Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). This was followed closely by Johnson v.
Luhman, 330 I11.
App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947), involving a child's suit for alienation of his
father's affections. The Second District Illinois Appellate Court held that children are "entitled to
both the tangible incidents of family life . . .and to the intangible, though equally significant
elements of affection, moral support, and guidance from both parents." Id. at 605, 71 N.E. at 813.
See also Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949), involving a child's action against
one who enticed his mother away; Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949), in
which three minor children sued for enticement of their mother.
13. 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980).
14. Although Ferriter was the first state supreme court decision to allow the child's cause of
action, it was preceded by a Michigan Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for
Hawaii. In 1955, the United States District Court in Hawaii heard the case of Scruggs v. Meredith, 134 F. Supp. 868 (D.C. Hawaii 1955). Scruggs involved a suit by five infants against the
person who negligently injured their parent. Because there was no'Hawaiian case law directly on
point, the court drew upon analogous Hawaiian precedent to justify allowing the children's cause
of action. Hawaiian courts had previously allowed a wife's cause of action for lost society and
companionship due to the wrongful death of her husband, Kake v. Horton, 2 Hawaii 209 (1860),
and a father's claim for nonpecuniary loss in the wrongful death of his child, Ferreira v. Honolulu
R.T. & L. Co., 16 Hawaii 615 (1905). Based on these and other Hawaiian decisions under the
Wrongful Death Act, the court reasoned that the Hawaii courts had evidenced their intention to
protect the family members' interest in the relationship. But, within two years, and while the
Scruggs case was pending appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court had ruled that a child did not have
a cause of action for lost society due to negligent injury. Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634
(1957). In a matter of months, the Ninth Circuit, applying the new Hawaiian case law, reversed
the Scruggs decision in Meredith v. Scruggs, 244 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1957). Again, not one jurisdiction allowed the child's cause.
Michigan was the next jurisdiction to allow the cause, in the case of Berger v. Weber, 82
Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978). The Michigan Appeals Court first examined United
States Supreme Court and Michigan Supreme Court cases recognizing increased legal rights for
children. The court noted that in many areas children now enjoy the same rights as do adults. The
court next drew on Michigan statutory and case law which allows adults a cause of action for loss
of spousal consortium in wrongful death and negligent injury actions. Applying the two principles
Published
by eCommons, 1981
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FACTS AND HOLDINGS

While working in his capacity as a carpenter for Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., Michael Ferriter was struck on the neck by a
wooden beam which slipped from an overhead crane. The injuries
caused Mr. Ferriter, a husband and father of two, to be paralyzed from
the neck down. Although worker's compensation provided Mr. Ferriter
with benefits for his injury, his family received nothing. Hence, his
family brought the present suit. 15
The complaint alleged that as a result of Mr. Ferriter's injuries
the children and wife were deprived of consortium and society. It further alleged the plaintiffs had suffered mental anguish upon viewing
Mr. Ferriter lying injured in his hospital room shortly after the accident; and that this mental anguish had resulted in impairment of their
mental and physical health. 6 The trial judge granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on impaired mental and physical health
claims but overruled a similar motion on the claim for lost society and
consortium.17 The Massachusetts Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' request for direct appellate review.
Although the defendants argued plantiffs' claims for mental
anguish and impaired mental health failed to state a claim for which
relief could be granted, no such attack was made on the claims for lost
society and consortium.' 8 The defendant instead argued both of plaintiffs' claims were barred by the state's Worker's Compensation Act.1 '
The Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned, based on the holding
of King v. Viscolid Co.,2 0 that even though Mr. "Ferriter waived his
common law rights of action by accepting benefits under the Worker's
Compensation Act, he did not and could not waive his spouse's and
children's rights."' The court also held that mental anguish brought on
by the shock of seeing an injured family member in the hospital was
compensable. The court interpreted previous holdings to find authority

to the case before it, the court held that a child does have a protectable interest in the society of
his parents and may sue for infringement upon that interest through negligent injury. The decision
was upheld shortly after release of the Ferriter decision. Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303
N.W.2d 424 (1981).
15. Mass. -, 413 N.E.2d 690, 691.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at -,.413 N.E.2d at 692.
20. 219 Mass. 420, 106 N.E. 988 (1914). In King, a young man was injured on the job and
received worker's compensation. The mother of the injured youth sued his employer for the costs
of caring for him. The court ruled that the mother sought recovery for her own injury and not her
son's. Her action was not waived by her son's waiver of his rights to sue.
21. Mass. -,
413 N.E.2d at 698.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/10
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for this decision 22 but added the qualification that the shock for which
recovery is sought must closely follow the accident.'5
The most significant aspect of the Ferritercourt holding was allowing the children of a negligently injured person to maintain a suit
for loss of parental society against the tortfeasor. The court held that a
minor child of a negligently injured person may have a claim for loss of
society if he is dependent upon the injured person for the filial needs of
closeness, guidance, and nurture, as well as for economic well being."
In contrast to the decisions on expansion of mental anguish claims and
suits that can be filed while receiving worker compensation benefits, the
decision on loss of society and companionship was not simply an interpretation of existing case law. The court had to distinguish many cases
and depart from long standing statements of public policy to allow the
children's cause of action.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Court's Rationale

Previous to Ferriter,not one state supreme court or federal court
had ever allowed a child's cause of action for loss of parental society in
negligent injury cases.25 This is evidence of the strong opposition to the
cause of action and an indication of the obstacles that stood in the Fer-

22. Id. at 413 N.E.2d at 696, 697.
23. Id. at -, 413 N.E.2d at 697.
24. Id. at -, 413 N.E.2d at 696.
25. Many jurisdictions have addressed the question whether a child has a cause of action
against the injurer of his parent and have answered a resounding no. The reasons for the rejection
vary among the courts. A partial listing of the courts that have rejected the cause and the considerations they found dispositive follows: Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110
(1975) (the injured parent has a cause of action in which the child can share); see also Borer v.
American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858 (1977) (the court is
without power to grant new causes of action, and the line has to be drawn somewhere); Taylor v.
Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A.2d 768 (1947) (claims are too susceptible of fabrication); Ripley v.
Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952) (potential of child pressing claim could upset settlements made
between parents and tortfeasor); Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634 (1957) (allowing child's claim
is similar to splitting parent's cause of action, creating a danger of double payment); Hoffman v.
Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962) (dangers of double recovery and multiplicity of suits);
Hayrynen v. White Pine Copper, 9 Mich. App. 452, 157 N.W.2d 502 (1968) (there is no interest
of a child that can be legally protected); Russell v. Salem Township, 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862
(1972) (child is totally deprived of a parent's benefit when parent is killed but not, except in
unusual circumstances, when he survives); Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y.S.
912 (1934) (allowing the claim would lead to increased litigation); Hennant v. Tidewater Power
Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925) (the child's injury is too remote from the wrong actually
done); see also Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949) (the child's injury is the
type that cannot and should not be compensated for); Gibson v. Johnston, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 413,
144 N.E.2d 310 (1956) (duty of the parent to support, educate, and protect his child was given
recognition at common law, but reciprocal rights of the child in his interest in the society and
affection of his parents were not recognized under common law).
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riter court's path.2 6 Although the defendant did not argue against the
existence of the cause, the court still had to deal with the concerns put
forth in previous analogous cases and inherent in public policy considerations.2 The Ferritercourt dissected each of these arguments, and
either distinguished them on the facts of Ferriteror dismissed them as
meritless.
The Ferritercourt first had to decide whether to recognize a new
cause of action for a nonpecuniary loss. Because damages are extremely difficult to set when nonpecuniary awards are sought, courts
are hesitant to allow such awards. The dangers of allowing fabricated
claims and unduly burdening the defendant must be balanced against
the social policies of compensating for injuries. In balancing these-competing interests, many courts have decided against allowing a child's
cause of action for nonpecuniary damages." The Ferritercourt, however, decided that the children did suffer a bona fide injury worthy of
compensation. In reaching its decision, the court looked to analogous
situations in which nonpecuniary losses have been ruled recoverable
and reasoned that the loss the children had suffered was so similar that
denial of the claim would be irrational. 9
The court compared the children's claim to that of the wife's claim
for loss of her husband's consortium.30 This claim had been attempted
but rejected in the early case of Feneff v. New York Central & Hudson
1 The Feneff court dealt with
River Railroad."
a case in which the husband had been injured through negligence, and was fully compensated
in a lawsuit which followed. Feneff's wife brought an action against the
tortfeasor alleging loss of consortium due to her husband's injuries. Although the court recognized both wives and children suffer injury when
the father is negligently injured, 2 it pointed out that the law had never
allowed them recovery. 3 The court reasoned that these actions should
be allowed only when injury resulted from an intentional act as through

26.

-

Mass.

-,

413 N.E.2d at 692.

27. As mentioned, the defendant did not attack the child's claim to his father's society as
being a claim for which relief cannot be granted. The question of sufficiency of the claim was
nevertheless fully considered by the court. After acknowledging that the defendant had not attacked on this basis, the court itself thoroughly canvassed the pertinent area of the law and carefully reasoned out its decision. Id.
28.

See note 25 supra.

29. The court first considered actions in which a wife sought compensation for lost spousal
consortium. - Mass. -, 413 N.E.2d at 692. The court also considered awards made under the
Wrongful Death Act. Id. at -, 413 N.E.2d at 695.
30.

Id. at

__,

413 N.E.2d at 692.

31. 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
32. Id. at 281, 89 N.E. at 437.
33. Id. at 282, 89 N.E. at 437.
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seduction, enticement, or criminal conversion of a spouse or parent." It
further held that recovery should never be allowed when the father has
already been fully compensated for his injuries.8 6 The Feneff court concluded when a spouse or parent is negligently injured, injury to the
remaining spouse and child is too remote to support an action.8 6
The Feneff decision represented the law of Massachusetts for over
sixty years."7 Thus neither children nor wives were allowed recovery for
damages done to the familial relationship caused by negligent injury of
the husband/father. This rule was altered, however, in 1973 when the
Massachusetts Supreme Court allowed a wife to seek recovery in the
case of Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co.88 The Diaz court took exception to the
Feneff opinion on two important points. First, the court noted that if
the wife was injured by a third party's actions, she should have the
opportunity to recover. The court reasoned further that the validity of
the wife's claim should not turn on whether the tortfeasor's actions
were "intentional" or "negligent." '8 9 As the court noted: the "dominant
• . . theme of our modern law of torts . . . [is that] presumptively
there should be recourse for a definite injury to a legitimate interest
due to lack of the prudence or care appropriate to the occasion." 40
The Diaz court also found the Feneff decision excessive in its concern over the threat of double recovery if a consortium claim were allowed.4 1 The Diaz court disposed of this risk by suggesting that joinder
of a spouse's claim with the husband's claim be mandatory, or that the
judge carefully instruct the jury.42 The court further suggested that
even if courts did nothing in the way of forcing joinder, defendants
could still protect themselves from double recovery by moving for con43
solidation of suits.
Through its interpretation of Diaz and Feneff, the Ferriter court
found precedent for allowing the new cause of action. The Feneff court
likened a child's claim for loss of parental society to a wife's claim for
loss of her husband's consortium but denied both. Diaz refuted Feneff's
rationale for denial, allowing a wife's loss of consortium claim. The

34. Id. at 280, 89 N.E. at 437.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 280, 89 N.E. at 438.
37. A wife was not allowed to recover for loss of spousal consortium until 1973 in the case
of Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973). Diaz is discussed at length in
the text accompanying notes 38-43 infra.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 159, 302 N.E.2d at 559.
40. Id. at 165, 302 N.E.2d at 562.
41. Id. at 161, 162, 302 N.E.2d at 560, 561.
42. Id. at 162, 302 N.E.2d at 560.
43. Id. at 162, 302 N.E.2d at 561.

Published by eCommons, 1981

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 7:2

Ferritercourt could not grant the children a cause of action, however,
until it addressed the Massachusetts case law that said a child had no
legal right to the care and presence of a parent."
The major case in this area with which the Ferritercourt had to
deal was Nelson v. Richwagen, s involving a minor's suit against a
third party who had enticed her mother into desertion. The child's action alleged her mother's absence deprived her of support, maintenance, and maternal care and affection. When deciding that the child
had no right to the care and presence of her parent, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court discussed its overall dislike for enticement actions. It
listed problems with such actions, including the possibility for multiplicity of suits, the possibility of extortionary litigation, the inability to
define the point at which the child's right to parental society would
cease, and the inability to assess damages accurately. 4"
The Ferriter court addressed these arguments individually and
found them to be either inapplicable to the case before it or no longer
valid. The first concern of the Nelson court, that enticement actions are
extortionary and similar to the prohibited intra-family tort suits, was
found completely inapplicable to the Ferritercase.4 7 The Ferritercourt
found the other concerns of the Nelson court, such as the potential

problem of multiple litigation, to have been resolved in Diaz."8 The real
problem facing the Ferritercourt was the Nelson conclusion that chil-

dren do not have a protectable interest in their parents' society.
To deal with this issue the court analogized the action before it to
one brought under the Wrongful Death Act.4 ' Under the Act, a child is
44. Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485, 95 N.E.2d 545 (1950). This case is discussed in
the text accompanying notes 45 and 46 infra.
45. Id.
46. In reaching the decision that a minor child has no legal right to the presence and care of
a parent, the Nelson court reasoned that such rights arise as a right of the marital relationship
only and "[d]esertion alone, without more, is a matrimonial wrong." Id. at 487, 95 N.E.2d at 546.
47. The Nelson court's concern with extortionary litigation was dispelled by the Ferriter
court. The Ferriter court reasoned, "when a third party's negligence causes injury to a parent and
the child suffers loss of society, the litigation does not typically set family members against each
other." Mass. ___ 413 N.E.2d at 694.
48. Id. at -, 413 N.E.2d at 695. The Diaz court, cited in Ferriter, suggested that a wife's
claim for consortium be mandatorily joined to the husband's action for negligent injury. The court
further suggested that double recovery could be prevented by careful jury instructions or by the
defendant moving for consolidation of the negligent injury and consortium claims into a single
trial. Id. at 161-63, 302 N.E.2d at 560-61.
49. The Ferriter court reasoned that since a child's interest in the family relationship is now
protected by statute, at least when the parent is tortiously killed, the Nelson holding that a child
has no protectable interest is no longer valid. Id. at _, 413 N.E.2d at 695.
The Massachusetts Wrongful Death Statute provides in pertinent part that one who is responsible for the wrongful death of another "shall be liable in damages in the amount of: (1) the
fair monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered, as
provided in section one, including but not limited to compensation for the loss of the reasonably

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/10
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allowed to recover for nonpecuniary loss. The court reasoned it was
illogical to protect a child's interest in the family relationship when the
parent was negligently killed, but not when he was severely injured
through negligence. 50 Thus, by overruling that portion of Nelson which
had held a child has no legal right to his parent's society, and by distinguishing or reasoning away the Nelson court's concern of multiple litigation and double recovery, the court was free to allow the child's
cause of action to stand.
B.

Application of Ferriter to Other Jurisdictions

Although three justices submitted dissenting opinions on other issues, 5 1 the Ferritercourt unanimously held a child should be allowed a
cause of action for the loss of society of his negligently injured parent.
The Ferriterdecision is based on an interpretation of a Massachusetts
decision allowing a wife's action for loss of consortium, 52 a Massachusetts statute providing for a child's recovery of nonpecuniary losses
when his parent is negligently killed, 58 and a conspicuous absence of
adverse Massachusetts decisions that are on point." Because the Ferriter decision is based on case law that is peculiar to Massachusetts

instead of widely accepted public policy, it may not be well received by
other jurisdictions.
Although there are many jurisdictions which allow nonpecuniary
recovery under Wrongful Death Acts,55 there remain some which do

expected net income, services, protection, care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel, and advice of the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages recovered."
MAss. ANN. LAWS

ch. 229, § 2 (Michie/Law Co-op 1979).

Children of the deceased are considered as "persons entitled to recover" under the statute.
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 1 (Michie/Law Co-op 1979).
50. Mass. __, 413 N.E.2d at 695. An excellent article discussing the potential equal
protection arguments to be used in jurisdictions allowing a child's claim for lost society under
wrongful death, but not when the parent is negligently injured, is Love, Tortious Interference with
the Parent-ChildRelationship: Loss of An Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND.
L.J. 590 (1976).
51. Chief Justice Hennessey along with Justices Quirico and Wilkins filed individual dissents to the Ferriter opinion. All of the justices 'agreed that the children's claim for lost society
should be allowed, however, Justice Quirico disagreed with allowing the children's claim when the
injured person has accepted benefits under worker's compensation. Chief Justice Hennessey and
Justice Wilkins also disagreed with allowing family members additional recovery when worker's
compensation has given benefits. Further, the two justices dissented to allowing, recovery for
mental anguish and physical impairment when the plaintiffs were not at the scene of the accident.
Mass. -,
413 N.E.2d at 703-10.
52. 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973).
53. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, §§ 1, 2 (Michie/Law Co-op 1979).
54. The Ferriter court noted that the question whether a child can recover for loss of a
parent's companionship and society caused by a defendant's negligence was a matter of first impression in Massachusetts. Mass. -, 413 N.E.2d at 692.
55. byStates
which allow
the recovery of nonpecuniary losses under their Wrongful Death
Published
eCommons,
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not." In addition, many jurisdictions have adverse decisions that are

Acts are listed below. Statutes that specifically provide for recovery of nonpecuniary loss are listed
alone, those that have been interpreted to allow the recovery are supplemented with cases so interpreting. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (Michie Supp. 1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-613 (West
Supp. 1981); Kemp v. Pinal County, 8 Ariz. App. 41, 442 P.2d 864 (1968) (holding surviving
parties may recover for loss of decedent's companionship, society, comfort, and guidance); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 27-909 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1981); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp.
1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-3 (Supp. 1974);
IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1981); Wyland v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 48 Idaho
789, 285 P. 676 (1930) (allowing recovery for loss of companionship); IOWA CODE ANN. §
633.336 (West 1976); KAN. CIV. PRO. CODE ANN. § 60-1904 (Vernon 1967); LA. CiV. CODE
ANN. art. 2315 (West 1979); Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 510 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1975) (under
Louisiana law, a widow and children miy recover for loss of decedent's love and affection); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904 (Michie 1974); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 229 § 2 (West
Supp. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A. 2922 (Callaghan 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02
(West 1981); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1962) (allowing nonpecuniary
loss for death of a child); see also Gunderson v. Northwestern Elevator Co., 47 Minn. 161, 49
N.W. 694 (1891) (denying nonpecuniary loss if adult dies); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Harrison 1980); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Miller, 153 Miss. 741, 121 So. 482 (1929) (companionship and society
held recoverable); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.090 (Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
93-28 10 (Allen-Smith Supp. 1977); Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 38 Mont. 521, 100 P.
971 (1909) (loss of consortium and society are in the list of "pecuniary" losses a wife may recover); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-809 (1979); Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686
(1973) (when a minor dies, parents can recover for loss of comfort and companionship); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 31-5 (West Supp. 1981); Suarez v. Berg, 117 N.J. Super. 456, 285 A.2d 68
(1971) (reading statute to include recovery for loss of care, guidance, and advice of decedent
under appellation of pecuniary loss); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (Michie Supp. 1981); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon Supp. 1981); DeVite v. United Air Lines, 98 F. Supp. 88
(D.N.Y. 1951) (holding nonpecuniary losses recoverable); S.C. CODE § 15-51-40 (Lawyers Co-op
Supp. 1980); Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 188 S.E.2d 470 (1972) (the statute allows recovery
for loss of society, comfort, and companionship plus grief; sorrow, wounded feelings, mental shock
and suffering in addition to pecuniary loss). S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-5-7 (Allen-Smith
Supp. 1980); Halvorsen v. Dunlap, 495 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1974) (loss of advice, assistance and
protection are proper elements of damage in an action for wrongful death of son); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-11-6, 7 (Allen-Smith Supp. 1978); Corbett v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 25 Utah 449,
71 P. 1065 (1903) (parent may recover for loss of society and comfort for daughter's death); VA.
CODE § 8.01-52 (Michie Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (Michie Supp. 1981); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 895.04 (West Supp. 1981).
56. States whose statutes or case law have never allowed recovery of nonpecuniary losses
include: ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (Michie 1975); Bonner v. Williams, 370 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1966)
(only punitive damages are recoverable not actual damages); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21203 (Bradford Supp. 1980); Mosley v. Prall, 158 Colo. 504, 408 P.2d 434 (1965) (damages are
compensatory only, a pecuniary loss must be shown); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555 (West
Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10; § 3704 (Michie Supp. 1980); Reynolds v. Willis, 58 Del.
368, 209 A.2d 760 (1965) (loss of consortium is not considered pecuniary); GA. CODE ANN. §
105-1308 (Harrison Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1979); Wilcox v.
Bierd, 330 IlI. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928), overruled on other grounds, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 216 N.E. 2d
140 (1966) (recovery is limited to pecuniary losses); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-2 (Bobbs-Merrill
1973); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1979) (legislature did not intend
recovery of loss of care, love, and affection or training and guidance loss for children); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 411.130 (Baldwin Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 (Michie 1978); Kilkenney v. Kenney, 68 N.M. 266, 361 P.2d 149 (1961) (husband's loss of wife's consortium not recoverable); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3 (Consol. Supp. 1980); Liff v. Schildkrout, 49
N.Y.2d 622, 427 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1980) (recovery for loss of society and companionship is not
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/10
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directly on point.5 In these jurisdictions the Ferriterdecision will have
little persuasive power.
Some of the jurisdictions that have decided against granting a

child's cause of action for lost parental society through negligent injury
have done so for reasons not addressed by the Ferriter court." In-

creased costs for tortfeasors, higher insurance premiums,"9 the potential
for disruption of settlements made between the tortfeasor and the
child's parents, ee and the fear that allowing a child an award of his own

will lead to family disruption61 are arguments that have found favor in
other jurisdictions. These arguments, although not addressed by the
Ferritercourt, could still be countered by utilizing some of the court's
rationale.

allowed); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-02 (Allen Smith Supp. 1981); Stejskal v. Darrow, 55 N.D.
606, 215 N.W. 83 (1927) (jury may consider pecuniary value of services the beneficiary might
reasonably have expected had decedent lived); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page Supp.
1980). At the time of this writing, a bill has passed the Ohio House of Representatives to amend
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2125.01, 2125.02, 2125.03. The bill is currently pending in the Senate.
If passed, the wrongful death act will allow a plaintiff to recover for loss of financial support, loss
of services, and loss of society including companionship, consortium, care, assistance, attention,
protectioh, advice, guidance, counsel, instruction, training, and education. Further, next of kin will
be allowed to recover for mental anguish and pain and suffering. H.B. No. 332, 114th General
Assembly (1981).
The legislation, if enacted, will apply to tortiously caused deaths occuring after January 1,
1982. It will be one of the most liberal wrongful death acts in the country and could provide Ohio
attorneys with powerful arguments for allowing a child's claim for lost parental society.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1054 (West Supp. 1980); Kaw Boiler Works v. Frymyer, 100
Okla. 81, 227 P. 453 (1924) (plaintiff may only recover for pecuniary losses he realizes). OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.020 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1.1 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 20-5-113 (Michie 1980); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon Supp.
1981); Hayward v. Southwest Arkansas Elec. Co-op Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1008 (D.C. Tex. 1979)
(no recovery for loss of parental society or grief and suffering); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492
(Supp. 1981); See Bassett v. Vermont Tax Dep't, 135 Vt. 257, 376 A.2d 731 (1977) (recovery is
limited to pecuniary loss); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.020 (West Supp. 1981); Woodbury v.
Hoquiam Water Co., 138 Wash. 254, 244 P. 565 (1926) (recovery is limited to pecuniary loss).
57. See note 26 supra.
58. In addition to arguments that were not even considered in Ferriter,such as the ones set
forth in notes 59-62 infra, the court mentioned two arguments to which it never responded. In
detailing the "four practical objections to the child's action" that the Nelson court considered, the
Ferritercourt listed "[i]nability to define the point at which the child's right would cease,
[and] [i]nability of a jury adequately to cope with the question of damages .
" -.- Mass. ___
413 N.E.2d at 694. The court's raising these concerns and failing to answer them, does not present a weakness in its reasoning. The court had before it the sole question whether the children
had a cause of action, not what damages were appropriate. The Ferriterdecision only allowed the
children to get into court; decision on the merits was still to follow. Only if the defendant were
found liable to the children, would the question of how to set damages become ripe.
59. Borer v. American Airlines Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858
(1977). For a detailed exploration of Borer see note 67 infra.
60. Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y.S. 912 (1934); cf. Ripley v. Ewell, 61
So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952) (concerning wife's action for lost consortium).
61. by
Russell
v. Salem Transportation
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The concerns of higher insurance premiums, increased costs for
tortfeasors, and family disharmony due to a child's recovery of a sizable award, for example, are all public policy concerns. The Ferriter
court pointed out that its decision was in accord with public policy as
expressed by Massachusetts General Law ch. 119 § 1.6 2 This statute
provides that the welfare of the state's children has top priority. If,
indeed, the public has set children's welfare as top priority, the interest
the community has in seeing that the children are fairly treated should,

arguably, override the economic interests in lower insurance premiums
or the concern that tortious conduct not be dealt with too severely. Furthermore, this public interest should outweigh the somewhat flimsy argument that a compensated child would disrupt the family.
The Ferriter decision can also be used to counter the argument
that settlements between the tortfeasors and the children's parents
would be susceptible to disruption. In deciding that the threat of multiple suits was without merit, the Diaz" decision, cited by Ferriter,e
pointed out that multiple litigation could be avoided by mandatory
joinder of claims." 8 This rule would also preclude a child from pressing
a claim that would destroy his parents' valid settlement.
Despite the rationale of Ferriter, there are still many prominent
courts that have well reasoned cases opposing the cause of action."

California has consistently refused to allow a child to collect nonpecuniary awards for such simple but powerful reasons as the necessity of
drawing the line somewhere and the fact that the award would really
not compensate the child anyway. 67 Other jurisdictions, such as Ohio,"
62. Mass. -,
413 N.E.2d at 695. MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § I (Michie Law/Co-op
1979) provides:
the policy of this commonwealth [is] to direct its efforts, first, to the strengthening and
encouragement of family life for the protection and care of the children; to assist and
encourage the use by any family of all available resources to this end; and to provide substitute care of children only when the family itself or the resources available to the family
are unable to provide the necessary care and protection to insure the rights of any child to
sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral development.
63. 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973).
64. Mass. -,
413 N.E.2d at 695.
65. 364 Mass. at 161-63,'302 N.E.2d at 560-61.
66. See note 26 supra.
67. Borer v. American Airlines Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858
(1977). The Borer decision involved a suit for loss of society, companionship, and other nonpecuniary losses by nine children of a negligently injured woman. The California Supreme Court ruled
the children could not maintain a cause of action for these losses. The court took a pragmatic
approach, deciding a line must be drawn somewhere. It reasoned, *[l]oss of consortium is an
intangible, nonpecuniary loss, monetary compensation will not enable the plaintiffs to regain the
companionship and guidance of a mother; it will simply establish a fund so that upon reaching
adulthood, when plaintiffs will be less in need of maternal guidance, they will be unusually
wealthy men and women." Id. at 447, 563 P.2d at 862. The court also contended that no matter
who the defendant is, the public foots the bill in the long run through higher insurance premiums
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/10
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have not allowed nonpecuniary loss even in Wrongful Death Actions."
In these jurisdictions the Ferriterdecision will have little effect.
The Ferriterdecision is a milestone in the field of children's rights,
but it may not be the trend setter that it seems. Although it is true that
commentators have been urging this new cause of action for years,7 0 it
is doubtful that the courts across the country are ready to recognize it.
In Berger v. Weber,71 the Michigan Supreme Court followed the
Ferriterdecision almost immediately after it was handed down and it
appeared as though a trend was about to begin, but this appearance is
deceiving. First, the Michigan decision, although citing Ferriter,was
actually upholding a lower court decision which was well reasoned in
its own right. Second, the fact that two state supreme courts ruled the
same way within a matter of months does not make a trend.
In June of 1981, just three months after the Michigan Supreme
Court handed down the Berger decision, an Oregon court of appeals
ruled the complete opposite, in Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital,7' which dealt with a child whose mother was allegedly brain damaged by a physician's negligence. The child claimed
that, as a result of the physician's negligence, he was "deprived of his
mother's society, companionship, support, and education and has incurred an obligation to support her after her own funds are exhausted.17 8 The court refused, however, to allow the cause of action,
claiming that the legislature, not the courts, should make the change.
The Oregon court's holding completely contradicts the Ferriter
holding and typifies the unwillingness of many courts to recognize new
causes of action absent a legislative pronouncement to that effect. The
Ferritercourt also considered the propriety of a court creating a new
cause of action yet concluded "[i] n a field long left to the common law,
and the greater cost of settling and litigating the increased claims for parental consortium that
would follow. One of the interesting things about the Borer decision is that, like Massachusetts,
California had previously ruled that wives have a claim to their husbands' consortium. Rodriquez
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). Further, California's
Wrongful Death Statute also.allows recovery for nonpecuniary loss. CAL. CIv. NROC. CODE § 377
(West Supp. 1981).
68. See note 57 supra.
69. See discussion on Ohio's proposed Wrongful Death Act at note 57 supra.
70. See Pound, Individual Interests in Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1916);
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 124 (4th ed. 1971); Love, Tortious Interference with the ParentChild Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590
(1976).
71. See note 14 supra.
72. Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 52 Or. App. 853, 631 P.2d 1377
(1981).
73.

Id. at 2048.
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change may well come about by the same medium of development.""'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Massachusetts Supreme Court decision in Ferriterv. Daniel
.O'Connell's Sons, Inc. represents a milestone in the protection of children's rights. By allowing the child to seek damages for loss of parental
society from the tortfeasor who negligently injured his parent, the court
has adopted a view long advocated by legal scholars but resisted by the
courts. Although the commentators have seen this cause of action as a
logical extension of the rapidly growing body of law concerned with
torts against the family, the courts have taken a very conservative,
pragmatic, approach toward expansion of-the law in this sector. Some
courts still hold that a child has no protectable interest in a parent's
society and refuse the new cause on that ground alone. Most courts,
however, recognize the child's right to parental society in actions such
as wrongful death but deny the right of action in negligent injury cases
because they believe the practical problems the cause would generate
outweigh the interests of the child.
The Ferritercourt recognized the potential for problems such as
double recovery, multiplicity of suits, and extortionary claims, but was
able to overcome them by offering methods to lessen the probability of
their arising. The Ferriterlogic in reasoning away these pragmatic concerns has already been cited with approval in the Michigan case of
Berger v. Weber as that jurisdiction became the second to recognize the
child's cause of action.
Problems such as increased insurance premiums, speculativeness of
damages and the potential for disruption of settlements between the
tortfeasor and other family members, which continue to concern other
courts, were not considered in Ferriter.Some of these concerns, plus
the lack of legislative pronouncements on the new cause of action, have
led Oregon to be the first state to enter a post-Ferriterrejection of the
child's right of action.
Although the Ferriterdecision was a well reasoned one which effectively dealt with some of the concerns voiced by other courts, it is
probably not the trend setter the commentators have hoped for. The
decision has added little to the arsenals of plaintiffs who hope to recover for lost parental society due to negligent injury in states that do
not allow nonpecuniary recovery under Wrongful Death statutes. In
states that do not allow recovery for loss of consortium, or states that
have expressed strong preference for statutory rather than judicially
recognized causes of action, the decision will also have little persuasive

74.

-

Mass.

-,

413 N.E.2d at 695.
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power.
The value of Ferriteris that it is now the law of Massachusetts
and Michigan that a child can seek recovery for loss of parental society
when his parent is negligently injured. If the law works and the legion
of predicted problems does not descend upon these two states, perhaps
other courts or legislatures will be persuaded to follow their lead in the
future. Although no sweeping trends may be forthcoming, at least future commentators can monitor the progress of the Ferriterexperiment
and have some empirical data to support their theories.
Louie R. Kindell
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